



My assigned topic is the question: Can policymakers spur or deter
technological change? The question is to be addressed from a micro
perspective, by examining policies regarding research and development
(R&D), patents, and competition. Since there is no point in keeping the
reader in suspense, I shall argue that government policy plays a major
role in influencing the rate of technological change in many important
industries.
The paper begins by looking at the salient features of federal support
of R&D activities in the private sector of the economy. The next two
sections take up the rationale for federal support of R&D and then
consider whether, on a priori grounds, it is possible to say with any
reasonable degree of certainty that underinvestment in R&D occurs in
particular parts of the private sector.
Measures of the social benefits from new technology are then taken
up, with particular emphasis on the social rate of return from investments
in new technology. The gap between social and private rates of return
from investments in new technology is also discussed. Building on the
previous results, I then put forth five guidelines regarding public policy
toward civilian technology. These guidelines are not new, but I believe
that they are just as applicable today as they were when first presented
20 years ago. The final sections of the paper take up the patent system and
antitrust policy, two areas continually subject to attention and contro-
versy.
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FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR R&D
Expenditures in the United States for R&D in 1995 totaled $171
billion, of which about 35 percent was financed by the federal govern-
ment (National Science Foundation 1995b). Federal R&D expenditures
are concentrated heavily in a relatively few areas. In 1996, almost $38
billion was spent on defense R&D and almost $8 billion on space R&D.
Health R&D accounted for over $11 billion. Other areas with significant
amounts of federally financed R&D were energy, environmental protec-
tion, transportation, agriculture, and education. The federal government
also spent a considerable amount on the general advancement of science
and technology (National Science Foundation 1995a).
Much of the federal R&D takes place outside government laborato-
ries. In 1995, the Department of Defense performed about one-fourth of
its R&D in government laboratories; most of the remainder was carried
out by industrial firms. Similarly, NASA did about one-quarter of its
R&D in government laboratories, while industry performed much of the
rest. On the other hand, the Department of Energy undertook about
one-half of its R&D in federally funded centers like Oak Ridge, Sandia,
Brookhaven, and Los Alamos, some of which are administered by private
firms, some by universities and other nonprofit institutions. Still other
agencies, like the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Commerce, carried out most of their R&D in their own laboratories.
Industries also exhibit substantial differences in the extent to which
their R&D is financed by the federal government. As shown in Table 1,
in 1992 the federal government financed about 40 percent of the R&D
in transportation and computer programming, the industries with the
largest shares of federally financed R&D. In the chemical, petroleum,
primary metals, and food industries, among others, the percentage of
total R&D that is federally financed is much smaller.
Finally, our nation’s colleges and universities are heavily dependent
upon the federal government for R&D funds. About 60 percent of the
R&D carried out by the colleges ahd universities is financed by the federal
government. Table 2 lists the 30 universities that received the most
federal support for R&D in 1993 and the amount each received. As would
be expected, the leading research-oriented universities, such as MIT,
Harvard, Cornell, Michigan, and Stanford, ranked among the highest. In
1990, the 100 universities and colleges at the top of this list received about
85 percent of the total federal obligations to colleges and universities.
RATIONALE FOR FEDERAL SUPPORT OF R&D
The rationale for federal support of R&D varies from one area to
another. Many areas with relatively large amounts of federally financed
R&D are intended to provide new or improved techi~ology for publicMICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 185
Table 1
Funds for R&D Performance, by Industry and Source, 1992
Millions of Dollars
Industry Federally
Industry Financed Financed Total
Total 96,654 24,660 121,314
Food 1,371 0 1,371
Tobacco 40 0 40
Textiles 190 a a
Apparel 69 ~ a
Lumber a 0 a
Furniture 168 a a
Paper 1,191 a ~
Printing ~ a 290
Chemicals 16,420 a 16,711
Petroleum 2,330 9 2,339
Rubber 1,337 a a
Leather a 0 a
Stone, Clay, and Glass 479 a a
Primary Metals 542 ~ 555
Fabricated Metal Products 764 293 1,057
Machinery 14,073 1,062 15,135
Electrical Equipment 9,689 3,857 13,546
Transportation 15,726 10,738 26,484
Instruments 7,426 2,226 9,652
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 322 ~ a
Communication Services 4,131 ~ a
Electric and Gas 309 ~ a
Computer Programming 3,889 2,774 6,663
Hospitals and Medical Laboratories 424 191 615
Research, Development, and Testing 8,286 1,381 9,667
Other Manufacturing 7,172 257 7,429
a Data withheld to avoid disclosing operations of individual companies.
Source: National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry, 1992. (VVashington, DO:
National Science Foundation, 1995.)
sector functions. Defense and space exploration, for example, are public
goods; it is inefficient (and often impossible) to deny their benefits to a
citizen who is unwilling to pay the price. The government is the sole or
principal purchaser of the equipment used to produce such goods; and
since it has primary responsibility for their production, it must also take
primary responsibility for the promotion of technological change in
relevant areas. Although much of the R&D of this type is performed by
private firms, its primary objective is to promote technological change not
in the private sector but in the public sector. While some beneficial
spillover to private industry may occur, it is likely to be much less than
if the funds were spent directly on private sector problems.186 Edwin Mansfield
Table 2
Federally Financed R&D Expenditures in Science and Engineering at the
30 Colleges and Universities Receiving the Largest Amounts, 1993
Millions of Millions of
Rank and University Dollars Rank and University Dollars
1 Johns Hopkins 674 16 Penn State 160
2 Washington 269 17 California, Berkeley 156
3 MIT 267 18 Southern California 150
4 Stanford 254 19 Pittsburgh 142
5 Michigan 250 20 Illinois 141
6 California, San Diego 243 21 Texas 139
7 Wisconsin 214 22 Colorado 139
8 California, San Francisco 210 23 Duke 136
9 Cornell 195 24 North Carolina 131
10 California, Los Angeles 189 25 Rochester 131
11 Columbia 183 26 Washington (St. Louis) 129
12 Harvard 182 27 Texas A & M 123
13 Minnesota 175 28 Arizona 113
14 Pennsylvania 174 29 Ohio State 109
15 Yale 169 30 California, Davis 105
Source: National Science Foundation, Academic Science and Engineering R&D Expenditures, Fiscal Year
1993, NSF 95-332.
Another rationale for large federally financed R&D expenditures
is the presence of some form of market failure. The fact that farms are
relatively small productive units has been used to justify federally
financed R&D for agriculture, for example. Further, some federally
financed R&D is directed toward the general advance of science and
technology. Such expenditures seem justified because the private sector
will almost certainly invest less than is socially optimal in basic research.
This underinvestment occurs because the results of such research are
unpredictable and usually of little direct value to the firm supporting the
research, although potentially of great value to society as a whole.1
ARE EXISTING FEDERAL PROGRAMS ADEQUATE?
Economic theory has been used to analyze whether existing federal
programs supporting civilian technology are likely to be adequate.
Because it is often difficult for firms to appropriate the benefits that
society receives from new technology, private investors may tend to
devote too few resources to its development. In particular, the more
competition there is and the more basic the information, the less appro-
1 See Alic, Branscomb, Brooks, Carter, and Epstein (1992); Cohen and Noll (1994); Eads
(1974); Grossman and Helpman (1991); and Mansfield and Lee (forthcoming).MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 187
priable the new technology is likely to be. Also, firms may invest too little
in inherently risky R&D efforts, because many seem to be risk averse and
have only limited and imperfect ways to shift these risks.
Moreover, particular kinds of R&D may be characterized by econo-
mies of scale that prevent small organizations from undertaking them
efficiently. This argument seems much more applicable to development
than to research, however. While firms may have to be of a certain
minimum scale to do many kinds of R&D effectively, this scale may be a
relatively small share of the market. In fact, small firms have been
responsible for many important innovations, while many big firms have
concentrated on more minor product improvement innovations. None-
theless, it is often argued that some industries are so fragmented, they
cannot do the proper amount of R&D.
Despite the relevance of the preceding arguments, they by no means
prove that there is at present any underinvestment in civilian technol-
ogy. For one thing, these arguments generally assume that markets are
perfectly competitive, whereas in fact many important markets are
oligopolistic. In oligopolistic markets, many economists believe that firms
often stress product improvement as a form of rivalry, rather than direct
price competition. Because of tacit agreement among the firms, product
improvement may even be the principal form of rivalry, with the result
that more may be spent on R&D than is socially optimal. This is not,
however, a proposition that is easy to prove or disprove.
Another reason why there may be no underinvestment in civilian
technology is that the government is already intervening in a large
number of ways to support civilian R&D. For example, a tax credit has
been granted for R&D and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s Advanced Technology Program has awarded hundreds of
millions of dollars in grants. Sematech (the Semiconductor Manufactur-
ing Technology Corporation) has received federal subsidies of $100
million a year, and in industries like aircraft, a host of government
influences promote R&D and technological change. It is not obvious, on
a priori grounds, thus, that the government has not already offset
whatever latent underinvestments existed in R&D.
Going a step further, Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) have
questioned whether on balance there is any reason for supposing that a
market economy results in too low a level of investment in R&D. They
conclude that the fact that only a relatively few firms are engaged in R&D
does not show that a market economy contains too little R&D activity,
and that the pressures of competition may result in excessive speed in
research.2
2 See Arrow (1962); Cohen and Noll (1991); Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980); Mansfield
(1996), and Romer (1990).188 Edwin Mansfield
MEASURING SOCIAL BENEFITS FROM NEW TECHNOLOGY
Because pure theory cannot tell us whether underinvestment in R&D
exists in the private sector (and if so, where it is most severe), let us turn
to the available empirical studies of the returns from R&D of various
types. Of course, measuring the social benefits from new technology
presents a variety of problems. Any innovation, particularly a major one,
has effects on many firms and industries, and obviously it is difficult to
evaluate each one and sum them up properly. Nonetheless, economists
have devised techniques that should provide at least rough estimates of
the social rate of return from particular innovations, assuming that the
innovations can be regarded as basically resource-saving in nature.
Consider a new product (used by firms) that can shift the supply
curve of the industry using the new product. How far downward this
supply curve will shift depends on the pricing policy of the innovator.
Assume that the innovator decides to set a price for its new product that
yields a profit to the innovator equal to r dollars per unit of output of
the industry using the innovation (for example, r dollars per appliance, in
the case of a new type of metal used by the appliance industry). Also,
assume that the industry using the innovation is competitive, that its
demand curve is as shown in Figure 1, and that its supply curve is
horizontal in the relevant range. In particular, suppose that, before the
advent of the innovation, this supply curve was S1 in Figure 1, and the
price charged by the industry using the innovation was P1. After the
advent of the innovation, this supply curve is $2, and the price is P2.
The social benefits from the innovation can be measured by the sum
of the two shaded areas in Figure 1. The upper shaded area is the
consumer surplus due to the lower price (P~ rather than P1) stemming
from the use of the innovation. Also, a resource saving occurs, along with
a corresponding gain in output elsewhere in the economy, because the
resource costs of producing the good using the innovation--including
the resource costs of producing the innovation--are less than P~Q~.
Instead, they are P2Q~ minus the innovator’s profits from the innovation,
the latter being merely a transfer from the makers of the good using the
innovation to the innovator. Thus, in addition to the consumer surplus
arising from the price cut, a resource saving occurs, amounting to the
innovator’s profits.
In many cases, two adjustments must be made in this estimate, which
corresponds with the lower shaded area in Figure 1. First, if the in-
novation replaces another product, the resource saving described in the
previous paragraph does not equal the innovator’s profits from the in-
novation, but these profits less those that would have been made (by the
innovator or other firms) if the innovation had not taken place and
the displaced product had been employed instead. This lesser amount is
the proper measure of the resource saving. Second, if other firms imitateMICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 189
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the innovator and begin selling the innovation to the industry that
employs it, their profits from the sale of the innovation must be added to
those of the innovator to get a complete measure of the extent of the
resource saving caused by the innovation.
One also can measure the social benefits from new products used by
individuals rather than firms, and from new processes. But since the
principles involved are much the same as those described above, we will
not present the measurement procedures here (see Mansfield et al. 1977a,
1977b).
SOCIAL RATES OF RETURN
By a social rate of return, we mean the interest rate received by
society as a whole from an investment. To economists, the social rate of
return from investments in new technology is important, since it mea-
sures the payoff to society from these investments. A high social rate of190 Edwin Mansfield
return indicates that society’s resources are being employed effectively
and that more resources should be devoted to such investments, if the
rate of return stays high. In a series of papers, I have tried to describe the
many difficulties in measuring and interpreting the social rate of return.3
They are numerous and important, but until something better comes
along, estimates of this sort are likely to continue to be used.
Although earlier efforts to measure the social rates of return from
such investments had been made in agriculture, the first attempt to
measure the social rate of return from investments in industrial innova-
tions was published in 1977. The innovations that were included in the
study took place in a variety of industries, including primary metals,
machine tools, industrial controls, construction, drilling, paper, thread,
heating equipment, electronics, chemicals, and household cleaners. They
occurred in firms of quite different sizes. Most of them were of average or
routine importance, not major breakthroughs. While the sample could
not be viewed as randomly chosen, we found no obvious sign that it
was biased toward very profitable innovations (socially or privately) or
relatively unprofitable ones. The findings indicated that the median social
rate of return from the investment in these innovations was 56 percent, a
very high figure (Mansfield et alo 1977a, 1977b).
It is important to recognize that this sample was not confined to
"winners." We went to considerable trouble to get as representative a
sample as possible. The innovations were chosen at random from those
carried out recently by the cooperating firms. A very substantial number
turned out to have low or negative private returns. (One interesting
finding was that the social rate of return tended to be very high for these
"losers" as well as for the "winners".) One of the contributions of this
study, in our opinion, was that it included a broader and more represen-
tative sample than any in the past. To extend this sample and replicate the
analysis, the National Science Foundation commissioned two studies, one
by Robert R. Nathan Associates (1978) and one by Foster Associates
(1978). Their results, like ours, indicate that the median social rate of
return tends to be very high. Based on its sample of 20 innovations,
Nathan Associates found the median social rate of return to be 70 percent.
Foster Associates, based on its sample of 20 innovations, found the
median social rate of return to be 99 percent.
More recently, Manuel Trajtenberg (1990) estimated that the social
rate of return to R&D in the field of CT scanners in medical technology
was about 270 percent. As he is careful to point out, the interpretation
of the gains as social depends on the motives underlying the behavior of
hospitals when choosing medical technologies. Also, as in the example
of hybrid corn, which Zvi Griliches (1958) studied, a high rate of return
For example, see Mansfield (1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1995d) and Nadiri (1993).MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 191
would be expected because the innovation was known in advance to be
a gusher, not a dry hole. But bearing these things in mind, Trajtenberg’s
results certainly are consistent with the proposition that the social rate of
return from investments in new technology tends to be high.
In sum, practically all of the studies carried out to date indicate that
the average social rate of return from industrial R&D is very high.
Moreover, the marginal social rate of return also seems high, generally in
the neighborhood of 30 to 50 percent. As I have pointed out elsewhere, a
variety of very important problems and limitations are inherent in each of
these studies.4 Certainly, they are very frail reeds on which to base policy
conclusions. But recognizing this fact, it nonetheless is remarkable that so
many independent studies, based on so many types of data, result in so
consistent a set of conclusions.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL AND
PRIVATE RETURNS
The gap between social and private rates of return from investments
in new technology is of great importance. A major rationale for govern-
ment support of civilian technology is that some R&D projects have social
rates of return far in excess of their private rates of return. What
determines the gap (if it exists) between the social and private rates of
return? One relevant factor is the market structure of the innovator’s
industry. If the innovator is faced with a highly competitive environment,
it is less likely to be able to appropriate a large proportion of the social
benefits than if it has a secure monopoly position or is part of a tight
oligopoly. Of course, the extent to which the innovator is subjected to
competition, and how rapidly, may depend on whether the innovation
is patented. Another consideration of at least equal importance is how
expensive it is for potential competitors to "invent around" the innova-
tor’s patents, if they exist, and to obtain the equipment needed to begin
producing the new product (or using the new process). In some cases,
like Du Pont’s nylon, it would have been extremely difficult to imitate
the innovation (legally). In other cases, a potential competitor could
obtain and begin producing a "me-too" product (or using a "me-too"
process) at relatively little cost.
Another factor that economists have emphasized as a determinant of
the size of the gap between social and private rates of return is whether
the innovation is major or minor. According to R.C.O. Matthews (1973),
the "degree of appropriability is likely to be less.., in major innovations
than in minor ones" since major innovations are more likely, in his view,
to be imitated quickly. Similarly, on the basis of a model stressing the
For example, see Mansfield (1991b).192 Edwin Mansfield
indivisibility of information, Kenneth Arrow (1962) concluded that "the
inventor obtains the entire realized social benefit of moderately cost-
reducing inventions but not of more radical inventions."
Still another consideration sometimes cited is whether the innovation
is a new product or a new process. Thus, Matthews hypothesized that the
degree of appropriability might be less for process innovations than for
product innovations. On the other hand, Richard Nelson, Merton Peck,
and Edward Kalachek (1967) stressed that new processes can often be
kept secret and that it frequently is difficult for one firm to find out what
processes another firm is using.5 This idea, of course, suggests that the
gap between social and private rates of return might be greater for
products than for processes.
Although most of these hypotheses seem quite plausible, they
unfortunately have been subjected to just one systematic empirical test,
which was based on data for only about 20 innovations (Mansfield et al.
1977a, 1977b). The results seem to support the hypotheses that the gap
between social and private rates of return tends to be greater for more
important innovations and for innovations that can be imitated relatively
cheaply by competitors. Apparently, when the cost of imitating the
innovation is held constant, it makes little or no difference whether the
innovation is patented--which seems reasonable, because whether or not
a patent exists is of relevance largely (perhaps only) because of its effects
on the costs of imitation. It is worth noting that this simple model can
explain about two-thirds of the observed variation in this gap among the
product innovations in our sample. However, at the same time, it is
important to bear in mind the small size (and age) of the sample.
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY
For about 25 years, a number of economists have warned that the
United States may be underinvesting in civilian technology. Among other
things, these economists point out that the marginal social rates of return
from investments in civilian technology have been very high, both in
agriculture and in industry, according to practically every study carried
out. Of course, each of these studies has a number of limitations, but
overall their conclusions are remarkably consistent.
The government can stimulate additional R&D in the private sector
in a variety of ways--by tax credits, R&D contracts and grants, expanded
work in government laboratories, altered regulatory policies, and prizes.
Although many economists suspect that underinvestment exists in cer-
tain areas of civilian technology, at the same time some voice concern that
the federal government, in trying to improve matters, could do more
See Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek (1967) and also Nelson (1959).MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 193
harm than good.6 In this regard, the following five guidelines may be
of use.
First, a program to stimulate R&D in the private sector should be
characterized by flexibility, small-scale probes, and parallel approaches.
In view of the relatively small amount of information available and the
great uncertainties involved, the research should be organized, at least in
part, to provide information concerning the possible returns from a larger
program. On the basis of the information that results, a more informed
judgment could be made concerning the desirability of increased or, for
that matter, perhaps decreased amounts of government support for R&D
in the private sector.
Second, any temptation to focus the program on economically
beleaguered industries should be rejected. The fact that an industry is in
trouble, or that it is declining, or that it has difficulty competing with
foreign firms is, by itself, no justification for additional R&D. More R&D
may not have much payoff there or, even if it does, the additional
resources may have a bigger payoff elsewhere in the economy. It is
important to recall the circumstances under which the government is
justified in augmenting private R&D. Practically all economists would
agree that such augmentation is justifiable only if the private costs and
benefits derived from R&D do not adequately reflect the social costs and
benefits. But many industries show little or no evidence of a serious
discrepancy of this sort between private and social costs and benefits.
Indeed, some industries may spend too much, from society’s point of
view, on R&D.
Third, except in the most unusual cases, the government should
avoid getting involved in the later stages of development work. In
general, this is an area where firms are far more adept than government
agencies. While situations may exist where development costs are so high
that private industry cannot obtain the necessary resources, or where it
is so important to our national security or well-being that a particular
technology be developed that the government must step in, such cases do
not arise very often. Instead, the available evidence indicates that, when
governments become involved in what is essentially commercial devel-
opment, they are not very successful at it.
Fourth, in any selective government program to increase support for
civilian technology, it is vitally important that a proper coupling occur
between technology and the market. In choosing areas and projects for
support, the government should be sensitive to market demand. To the
extent that it is feasible, potential users of new technology should play a
6 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (1995); Eisner, Albert, and
Sullivan (1986); Council of Economic Advisers (1994); and U.S. General Accounting Office
(1996).194 Edwin Mansfield
role in project selection. Information transfer and communication be-
tween the generators and the potential users of new technology are
essential, if the innovation is to be successfully applied. As evidence of
the importance of this guideline, studies show that a sound coupling of
technology and marketing is one of the characteristics most significant in
distinguishing firms that are relatively successful innovators from those
that are not (Freeman 1973).
Fifth, in formulating any such program, it is important to recognize
the advantages of pluralism and decentralized decision-making. If the
experience of the last 30 years has taught us anything, it has taught
us how difficult it is to plan technological development. Technological
change, particularly of a major or radical sort, is marked by great
uncertainty. It is difficult to predict which of a number of alternative
projects will turn out best, and very important concepts and ideas come
from unexpected sources. It would be a mistake for a program of this sort
to rely too heavily on centralized planning. Moreover, it would be a
mistake if the government attempted to carry out work that private
industry can do better or more efficiently.
THE PATENT SYSTEM
One of the major instruments of national policy, regarding technol-
ogy is the patent system. Since the Congress passed the original patent
act in 1790, the arguments used to justify the existence of the patent
laws have not changed very much. First, these laws are regarded as an
important incentive to induce the inventor to put in the work required to
produce an invention. Particularly in the case of the individual inventor,
it is claimed that patent protection is a strong incentive. Second, patents
are regarded as a necessary incentive to induce firms to carry out the
further work and make the necessary investment in pilot plants and other
items that are required to bring the invention to commercial use. If an
invention became public property when made, why should a firm incur
the costs and risks involved in experimenting, with a new process or
product? Another firm could watch, take no risks, and duplicate the
process or product if it were successful. Third, it is argued that, because
of the patent laws, inventions are disclosed earlier than otherwise; as a
consequence, other inventions are facilitated by the earlier dissemination
of the information.
Not all economists agree that the patent system is beneficial. A patent
represents a monopoly right, although it is often a very weak one. Critics
of the patent system stress the social costs arising from the monopoly.
They point out that, after a new process or product has been discovered,
it may cost little or nothing for other persons who could make use of this
knowledge to acquire it. (However, the cost of technology transfer
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charge a price for the use of the information, with the result that the
knowledge is used less widely than is socially optimal. Critics also point
out that patents have been used to create monopoly positions that were
sustained by other means after the original patents had expired; they cite
as examples the aluminum, shoe machinery, and plate glass industries.
Further, the cross-licensing of patents often has been used by firms as a
vehicle for joint monopolistic exploitation of their market.
Critics also question the extent of the social gains arising from the
system. They point out that the patent system was designed for the
individual inventor, but that over the years most research and develop-
ment has become institutionalized. They assert that patents are not really
important as incentives to the large corporation, since it cannot afford
to fall behind in the technological race, regardless of whether or not it
receives a patent. They also assert that, because of long lead times, most
of the innovative profits from some types of innovations can be obtained
before imitators can enter the market. Also, they say that firms keep secret
what inventions they can, and patent those they cannot.
Patents are much more important in some industries than in others.7
Among a random sample of 100 U.S. firms from 12 industries (excluding
very small firms), patent protection was judged to be essential for the
development or introduction of 30 percent or more of the inventions in
only two industries--pharmaceuticals and chemicals. In another three
industries (petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products), patent
protection was estimated to be essential for the development and
introduction of 10 to 20 percent of their inventions. In the remaining
seven industries (electrical equipment, office equipment, motor vehicles,
instruments, primary metals, rubber, and textiles), patent protection was
judged to be of much more limited importance (Mansfield 1986). Accord-
ing to another study, product patents were regarded as much more
important by the drug and organic chemical industries than by most
others, and process patents were regarded as most important by the drug
and chemical industries (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter 1987).
Without question, the patent system enables innovators to appropri-
ate a larger portion of the social benefits from their innovations than
would be the case without it, but patents may not be very effective in this
regard. Contrary to popular opinion, patent protection does not make
market entry by imitators impossible, or even unlikely. Within four years
of their introduction, 60 percent of the patented successful innovations
included in one study had been imitated. Nonetheless, patent protection
generally increases the cost (to the imitator) of imitation. According to
Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981), the median estimated increase
in imitation cost was 11 percent. Patents had the biggest impact on
See Mansfield (1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1986); Ordover (1991), and Scotchmer (1991).196 Edwin Mansfield
imitation costs in the ethical drug industry, a finding that helps to explain
why patents are regarded as more important in ethical drugs than
elsewhere. (The median increase in imitation cost was about 30 percent in
ethical drugs, in contrast to about 10 percent in chemicals and about 7
percent in electronics and machinery.)
Do the benefits derived from the patent system outweigh its costs?
Like many broad issues of public policy, the facts are too incomplete and
too contaminated by value judgments to permit a clear-cut, quantitative
estimate of the effects of the patent system. Nonetheless, few leading
economists, if any, favor abolition of the patent system. Even those who
publish their agnosticism with respect to the system’s effects admit that
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to
recommend abolishing it.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ANTITRUST POLICY
Finally, a considerable amount has been written by economists
concerning the effects of market structure and antitrust policy on the rate
of technological change. Although we are far from having final or
complete answers, the following generalizations seem warranted, based
on the available evidence.
The role of the small firm is very important at the stage of invention
and the initial, relatively inexpensive stages of R&D. Studies indicate that
small firms and independent inventors play a large, perhaps a dispro-
portionately large, role in conceiving major new ideas and important
inventions. Further, although full-scale development often requires more
resources than small firms command, the investment required for devel-
opment and innovation is seldom so great or so risky that only the largest
firms in an industry can undertake the innovating or the developing.
Studies of the drug, coal, petroleum, and steel industries indicate that, in
all of these industries, the firms that carried out the most innovations,
relative to their size, were not the biggest firms. However, in the chemical
industry, the largest firm was the most innovative relative to its size.a
A variety of surveys have been made of the empirical evidence
regarding the most favorable conditions for industrial innovation. Wesley
Cohen and Richard Levin (1989) conclude that "[T]he effects of firm size
and concentration on innovation, if they exist at all, do not appear to be
important." Others come to essentially the same conclusion, although
threshold effects are recognized. F.M. Scherer (1992) summarizes the
situation as follows:
8 See Acs and Audretsch (1990); Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerrnan (1970); Hall (1993); von
Hippel (1988); Hirshleifer (1973); and Kamien and Schwartz (1982).MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 197
Even though idea-rich small firms originate a disproportionate share of
innovations, most small enterprises are not particularly innovative. Large
companies may carry their new technologies to a higher degree of perfection
than small firms, and ... they may excel at certain kinds of innovative
activities. But neither giant company size nor a high degree of seller concen-
tration appears necessary to maintain a vigorous pace of technological
advance. Keeping markets open to new entrants with novel ideas--a notion
closer to the Schumpeterian vision of 1912 than to his 1942 view--seems a
more important condition for progress.
Two other points should be noted. First, new firms and firms
entering new markets play a very important role in the process of
technological change. Existing firms can be surprisingly impervious to
new ideas, and one way that their mistakes and inertia can be overcome
in our economy is through the entry of new firms. Second, economists
generally agree that the ideal market structure from the point of view of
promoting technological change is one characterized by a mixture of firm
sizes. Complementarities or interdependencies exist among firms of
various sizes. A division of labor often occurs, with smaller firms focusing
on areas requiring sophistication and flexibility and catering to special-
ized needs, and bigger firms focusing on areas requiring larger produc-
tion, marketing, or technological resources.
Thus, the available evidence does not indicate that we must permit
very great concentration of American industry in order to achieve rapid
technological change and the rapid adoption of new techniques. Instead,
it seems to suggest that public policy should try to eliminate unnecessary
barriers to entry and to promote competition in American industry.
CONCLUSIONS
Without question, government policy has a major impact on the rate
of technological change. The federal government supports about 35
percent of the research and development in the United States, the impact
being greatest in defense, space, and health. But the effects extend far
beyond these areas. In terms of dollar support, the federal government
(particularly the National Science Foundation, the Department of De-
fense, and the National Institutes of Health) provided about two-thirds of
the funding for academic researchers cited by the information processing,
electronics, chemical, instruments, pharmaceutical, metals, and petro-
leum industries as having made significant contributions to innovations
in these industries during the 1980s (Mansfield 1995d).
Controversy has been continual over the past 35 years with regard to
the proper role of the federal government in supporting civilian technol-
ogy. Since pure theory cannot provide unambiguous guidance, a variety
of empirical studies have been carried out. The results, while subject to
many limitations, seem to indicate that the social rate of return from R&D198 Edwin Mansfield
is very high, generally about 30 to 50 percent. Also, some evidence has
been found that the gap between social and private rates of return tends
to be greater for more important innovations and for innovations that can
be imitated relatively cheaply by competitors.
There seems to be considerable reason to pursue small-scale efforts
to shed light on the desirability of increased support for various types
of civilian technology. However, such efforts hold many potential pitfalls.
In particular, the temptation to focus programs on economically belea-
guered industries should be resisted; the government should avoid
getting involved in the later stages of development work; a proper
coupling should occur between technology and the marketplace; and it is
important to recognize the advantages of pluralism and decentralized
decision-making.
In recent years, the federal government has set in motion a variety of
technology programs, including the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s Advanced Technology Program, which has devoted hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to projects aimed at the development and
commercialization of technologies with high potential payoff. Given the
controversy over this program in the Congress, the need for more and
better information concerning the social rate of return from the resources
allocated to this program is obvious. It seems doubtful that estimates
based on forecasted data at the beginning of projects will be very
accurate, but with updating as commercialization and diffusion occur,
valuable information can be obtained concerning social rates of return, as
well as the size of forecast errors and how one can devise and use early
estimates in a civilian technology program of this sort.9
The patent system also remains a topic of considerable controversy.
Except for a relatively narrow slice of the economy, in particular
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, patents tend to be of secondary impor-
tance. However, few leading economists, if any, favor abolition of the
patent system. Indeed, one of the interesting developments in recent
years has been a growing recognition that the strength or weakness of a
country’s system of intellectual property protection seems to have a
substantial effect, particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds
of technology transferred by foreign firms to that country. Also, this
factor seems to influence the composition and extent of U.S. foreign direct
investment, although the size of the effects seems to differ greatly from
industry to industry.1°
Economists have shown a keen and continuing interest in the effects
of antitrust policy on technological change. In general, the effects of firm
size and industrial concentration on the rate of innovation do not appear
See Mansfield (1995b).
10 See Mansfield (1995a, 1995c) and Lee and Mansfield (1996).MICROECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 199
to be of major consequence. Complementarities and interdependencies
are found among firms of varying sizes. Accordingly, most analysts agree
that we should try to eliminate unnecessary barriers to entry and to
promote competition in American industry, since achieving rapid tech-
nological change and the rapid adoption of new techniques does not
require a high level of industrial concentration.
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Samuel S. Kortum*
Edwin Mansfield has made an enormous contribution to our under-
standing of the economics of technological change. His papers are
distinctively direct. To learn about the excess social return to innovation,
Mansfield et al. (1977) collected detailed information on a sample of
innovations and calculated, for each one, the social and private return.
The median social rate of return was over 50 percent, roughly twice the
median private return. To learn what patents do, Mansfield, Schwartz,
and Wagner (1981) asked firms how patenting an innovation affected the
cost and time required for a competitor to imitate it. Patenting raised the
cost of imitation on average 10 percent, yet most patented innovations
were imitated within four years anyway. To learn about the international
transfer of technology, Mansfield and Romeo (1980) asked U.S.-based
firms how many years elapsed between the introduction of a new
technology in the United States and its transfer to an overseas subsidiary.
The mean lag was six years for subsidiaries in developed countries and 10
years for subsidiaries in developing countries. Because direct evidence of
this sort is all too rare, I keep Mansfield’s articles handy.
In the current paper, Mansfield examines the question: Can policy-
makers spur or deter technological change? Mansfield conducts an
informed review of the different government practices that could poten-
tially influence the rate of technological change: research performed by
government, research funded by government, research subsidized by
government, patent protection, and antitrust policy. He surveys the
arguments for a government role in promoting research and suggests
*Assistant Professor of Economics, Boston University. The author has benefited from
Joshua Lerner’s comments.202 Samuel S. Kortum
some guidelines for government intervention. Mansfield concludes: Yes,
"government policy has a major impact on the rate of technological
change."
At first glance his conclusion appears obvious. How could the
federal government--performing 10 percent of U.S. R&D, directly fund-
ing 35 percent of it (NSF 1995), and giving it special tax treatment--not
have a major impact on technological change? There are two possibilities.
First, government policies may have had little effect on incentives to
perform research. Second, technological change may not be very respon-
sive to incentives. For example, the rate of technological change may have
more to do with the arrival of technological opportunities than with the
number of researchers attempting to exploit them. Perhaps, as Francis
Bacon put it, "Time is the greatest innovator."1
I will use an economic model to show that this second possibility
is not so easy to debunk. The logic is simple. Innovations will have value
as long as they cannot be freely imitated. Researchers will therefore
compete for innovations whether or not R&D effort, on the margin, leads
to new discoveries. Thus, a world in which R&D is simply a way of
dividing the pie will be difficult to distinguish from a world in which the
marginal R&D expenditure leads to innovations that would not otherwise
have occurred.
Before launching into this argument, I offer a note of caution. The fact
that a model of exogenous technological change is difficult to reject does
not imply that it is correct. Nonetheless, formulating it will serve to
highlight where our understanding of technological change is weak, and
hence where our policy advice is shaky.
ENDOGENOUS R&DmEXOGENOUS
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
To be credible, a model of exogenous technological change must fit
some basic facts related to R&D and its correlation with other economic
variables. A simple model of perfect competition can be rejected because
it will not account for any private investment in R&D.
A good starting point instead is Arrow (1962): The owner of a
patented process innovation licenses it to producers in a competitive
industry in return for a royalty payment.2 Suppose that the demand for
industry output, at price p, is simply y = S/p, where S is a demand shifter
(equal to the value of industry sales). At a point in time, unit production
~ Bacon is quoted by Merton (1961, p. 349) in an essay on multiples in science (the
multiple discovery of the same thing).
2 This is also an interpretation of the framework described in the section of Mansfield’s
paper entitled "Measuring Social Benefit from New Technology," under the special case
where the innovator has all the bargaining power, so that P2 = P~.DISCUSSION 203
cost is a constant c. It follows that the royalty rate for a process innovation
is the reduction in unit cost it makes possible.
Arrow’s model of the incentive to innovate says nothing about where
innovations come from. In the spirit of Bacon, assume that time generates
one opportunity for a process innovation each year. An innovation, if
developed and adopted, leads to a fixed percentage reduction in unit cost,
as in the quality ladders model of Grossman and Helpman (1991). For
example, if unit cost is ct_1 in year t - 1, then after the year t innovation
Ct-1 - The parameter 3~ ~ 0 can be is adopted the unit cost falls to ct    1 + ~/"
thought of as the ’size’ of an innovation. Suppose for simplicity that
patent protection applies only to the state-of-the-art process at any point
in time. Competition will result in zero royalties for all but the most
recent innovation. The royalty rate in year t will therefore be ct_1 - ct =
7ct. Under perfect competition, the industry price in year t is the sum of
unit production cost and the royalty rate, Pt = (1 + "y)Ct. The total
royalty received by the owner of the patent on the innovation adopted in
year t is therefore
1 + 7 1 + V
In what sense is technological change exogenous? Suppose that an
innovative opportunity can be developed by a researcher at a cost of d,
and would then be adopted the following year. Which researcher is ’first
to invent’ and hence able to patent the innovation? After committing to
R&D investments of d, each researcher will develop the invention at some
time during the year. Who is first to invent is determined by chance; if
there are n researchers, they each face a 1/n chance of being first.3 With
free entry into research, and ignoring the integer problem, n should
1 V
satisfy d =      r’ where r is the interest rate. It is assumed throughout
nl+
that the parameters satisfy d(1 + 3~)(1 + r) -> 2 (so that n >- 2), and hence
each innovation will be developed with or without the help of the last
researcher. Annual R&D expenditures in the industry are given by
3 This model of research is a special case of Tandon (1983). Notice that multiple
’discoveries’ of the same thing (multiples) generally will occur. Merton (1963) argues that
multiples are ubiquitous, but he envisions a more sophisticated model in which more
parallel research increases the probability of someone making a discovery. He suggests that
there is an optimal amount of redundancy in research, being "that amount which will
approximate a maximum probability of achieving the wanted outcome but not so great an
amount that the last increment will fail appreciably to enlarge that probability" (p. 380).
These concepts are formalized in the general case of Tandon’s model.204 Samuel S. Kortum
V      3"S
R = nd -       -
1 + r (1 + r)(1 + 3’) "
The model accounts for private R&D even though (for R ~ d) technolog-
ical change is unrelated to R&D.4
CAN THIS MODEL FIT THE FACTS?
To convince someone of the importance of R&D in determining the
course of technological change, it is natural to point to the vast literature
on R&D and productivity surveyed in BLS (1989). Econometric studies
have uncovered a systematic relationship between the growth of total
factor productivity (TFP) and research intensity (the R&D-sales ratio).
Unfortunately, these results do not provide convincing evidence against
a model, such as the one laid out above, in which teclmological change is
essentially exogenous.
To see this, assume that the model above held in each of i -- 1 .... ,
N industries. Industries might differ according to the value of sales Si and
the size of innovations 3’i. TFP growth in industry i is simply 3’i. Research
intensity (RI) in industry i is _Ri/Si = (1 + r)(1 + 3’i)" This leads to the
equation,
(1 + r)RIi
TFP~ I _ (I + r)RIi (l+r)RIi,
where the approximation is adequate for the small values of research
intensity that are actually observed. Even though technological change is
exogenous, one would get a slope coefficient of I + r by regressing TFP
growth on R&D intensity across the N industries.5
This identification problem has been articulated by Griliches (1995,
p. 80):
one may wind up reporting something as an estimate of the effect of R&D
on output which may be mostly a reflection of the effect of output on R&D
rather than vice versa.
4 Note that the last researcher’s efforts provide no benefit to society. To my knowledge,
Barzel (1968) was the first to present a model in which competition could lead to excessive
R&D.
~ The uncharacteristically large coefficient (1 + r) implied by this model--econometric
estimates are closer to 0.3 (Griliches 1995, Table 3.3)--is a result of the simplifying
assumption that a new innovation arrives each year, hence there is only one year to recoup
R&D expenses.DISCUSSION 205
The model above simply illustrates an extreme example of this conun-
drum.
I now turn to Mansfield’s approach, in earlier work, of directly
measuring the rate of return to innovations. In the world described by the
simple model of exogenous technological change, the private (internal)
rate of return to research is r and the marginal social rate of return to
research is -100 percent (that is, the marginal expenditure on research
has a cost but confers no benefit to society). What would one conclude by
collecting data on innovations? The naive economist, collecting data only
from the firm that patents the innovation, would calculate an extraordi-
narily high social and private rate of return on the winner’s small
investment in research. A more sophisticated economist would count as
expenditure all the research costs of the losing firms as well as the winner.
In this way, the private rate of return to research would be calculated
correctly as equal to the market return r. (This is exactly the condition that
determines the equilibrium level of R&D for the industry.) But the
marginal social rate of return would be calculated incorrectly as being
greater than r, since the social benefits of the innovation extend indefi-
nitely. The mistake in this calculation is that the social benefit should not
be attributed to the marginal expenditure on research.
In principle, Mansfield and his collaborators (1977) would not have
been fooled by this problem. As they clearly state,
we calculated the social benefits only during the period between the date when
the innovation occurred and the date when it would have appeared if the
innovator had done nothing.
In the world of exogenous technological change described by the model,
Mansfield would correctly conclude that each innovation would have
occurred even if the innovator had done no research. Nonetheless, one
worries that such calculations, based on survey evidence, are sensitive to
answers by the innovating firm to hypothetical questions about its
competitors. Just as the econometric approach has shortcomings, in
practice the direct approach is also very difficult to get right.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
It is useful to work through several policies toward research in the
framework of the model above, even though each policy will, by
assumption, have no effect on technological change. First, consider
research performed by the government. Suppose that a government
researcher acts like a private researcher, attempting to lay claim to a new
innovation but then making it available to producers in return for a
royalty. In that case, if government research in the industry is less than
the equilibrium level of research, government research simply crowds out206 Samuel S. Kortum
private research and the total level of research is unchanged by the
government intervention.
A government subsidy of research will work somewhat differently.
A 10 percent subsidy will lead researchers to raise their gross-of-subsidy
expenditures by 10 percent so that their net-of-subsidy expenditures are
left unchanged. Thus, the research subsidy will be successful at raising
research activity, although it will not alter the rate of technological
change.
A policy of strengthening patent protection can also be analyzed
with this model. Let 0 index the strength of patent protection: With
probability 0, patent protection prevents imitation for exactly one year,
otherwise imitation is immediate despite patent protection. Under this
07S
generalization of the model, equilibrium R&D is R = (1 + r)(1 + 3~) "It is
increasing in the strength of patent protection, as is R&D intensity.6 In
this model, strengthening patent protection raises R&D and lowers
consumer surplus (since goods are less frequently supplied at marginal
cost) but has no effect on technological change.
CONCLUSION
The government’s ability to spur technological change depends
ultimately on the responsiveness of technological change to research
efforts. But not much evidence is available about the true elasticity of
technological change with respect to research effort. A model of endog-
enous R&D and exogenous technological change (in which the true
elasticity is zero) is surprisingly hard to reject. Mansfield’s own calcula-
tions of the social return to research stand up well to this scrutiny but, as
he admits, "Certainly, they are very frail reeds on which to base policy
conclusions."
I conclude on a more optimistic note. An econometric analysis of a
specific policy change could provide key evidence on the issue of how
technological change responds to research. Take, for example, the in-
creased protection that patents have received since the Congress, in 1982,
created the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. An unprecedented
6 The model needs to be slightly enriched in order for the strength of patent protection
to influence the fraction of innovations that are patented. Suppose that 3’ is drawn from a
known distribution F after R&D decisions are made but before the patenting decision is
made. For simplicity assume that unpatented innovations are imitated immediately. If
patenting has a cost, then innovations whose size is below some threshold will not be
protected (the R&D equation must also be modified to reflect this option value of patenting).
If the strength of patent protection increases relative to the cost of patenting, then the
fraction of im~ovations that are patented will rise. A model of this sort is used by Eaton and
Kortum (1996) to infer patterns of international technology diffusion from patterns of
international patenting.DISCUSSION 207
burst of patenting activity in the United States resulted; nothing like it
had been seen in the past 70 years.
It may be difficult to conclude much from the aggregate time series,
but this policy change is likely to have hit different industries differently.
Both Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) and Levin et al. (1987)
report great variation across industries in the importance of patents. One
would expect to see research intensity rise by more in those industries in
which patents are an important means of appropriating the fruits of R&D.
If technological change is exogenous, then variation in R&D intensity
generated by a change in policy would have no impact on productivity.
Hence, if industry-level productivity has responded in a systematic way
to policy-induced changes in research intensity, this would be persuasive
evidence of government’s ability to influence technological change.
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Joshua Lerner*
Edwin Mansfield’s thoughtful review of the literature on the eco-
nomics of teclxnological change raises a variety of interesting issues, far
too many to address in a few pages. Consequently I will focus my
discussion on the section that I found most challenging and thought-
provoking--his prescriptions for policymakers, in the section "Public
Policy toward Civilian Technology." In particular, my discussion revisits
these recommendations with a particular question in mind: Should public
technology policy be affected by the fact that a disproportionate number
of radical innovations are generated by small firms? Viewing his policy
prescriptions through these lenses may help enrich the discussion.
THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF NEW ENTRANTS
As Mansfield observes in a later section, "Technological Change and
Antitrust Policy," one of the empirical regularities emerging from studies
of technological innovation is the role played by new entrants. From the
pioneering study of Jewkes, Sawers, and Stillerman (1958), Acs and
Audretsch (1988), and other works, economists have gradually realized
that these young firms often play a key role in identifying where new
technologies can be applied to meet technological needs, and in rapidly
introducing products. (These patterns are also predicted in several
models of technological competition, many of which are reviewed in
Reinganum 1989.) While several studies suggest that established firms
*Associate Professor, Harvard Business School. The author thanks Samuel Kortum,
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have a substantial advantage in incremental innovation, small firms
appear to generate a disproportionate share of radical breakthroughs.
The 1990s have seen several dramatic illustrations of this pattern.
Two potentially revolutionary areas of technological innovation--bio-
technology and the Internet--were pioneered by smaller entrants, typi-
cally backed by venture capital investors. Neither established drug
companies nor mainframe computer manufacturers were pioneers in
developing these technologies. By and large, small firms did not invent
the key genetic engineering techniques or the Internet protocols. Rather,
the bulk of the enabling technologies were developed with federal funds
at academic institutions and research laboratories. It was the small
entrants who were the first to seize upon the commercial opportunities.
In some cases, these new firms--utilizing the capital, expertise, and
contacts provided by their venture capital investors--established them-
selves as market leaders. In other instances, they were acquired by larger
corporations or entered into licensing arrangements with such concerns.
These patterns can only be expected to occur more frequently in
coming years. The pool of venture capital has expanded eightfold (in
inflation-adjusted dollars) since 1978, vastly increasing the resources
available for young technology-based firms. While the share of venture
resources going to seed and early-stage firms (as opposed to expansions
or buyouts of already profitable concerns) dipped in the mid 1980s, in
recent years an increasing share of venture capital disbursements has
gone to early-stage firms. Meanwhile, National Science Foundation
tabulations suggest that the share of total industrial R&D spending
accounted for by major corporations has fallen considerably.1
INNOVATION AND THE MARKET TEST
How should these patterns affect the design of U.S. technology
policy? While Professor Mansfield thoughtfully lays out five criteria
for the assessment of technology programs, I believe that one of these
might be rethought in light of these patterns, and that an additional
consideration might be added.
First, given this pattern of innovation, I am somewhat skeptical of his
claim that "it is vitally important that a proper coupling occur between
i Data on venture capital fund-raising and disbursements are available in the various
publications of Venture Economics and VentureOne. Recent data on research and develop-
ment expenditures by firms of different sizes are available in National Science Board (1996).
It is still important to point out that disbursements by venture capital funds (which go for
a wide variety of purposes in addition to R&D, such as capital expenditures and salaries) are
vastly smaller than R&D performed by major American corporations. In fact, in the years
1970 through 1994, total annual disbursements of the venture capital industry never
exceeded the R&D expenditures of either IBM or General Motors.210 Joshua Lerner
technology and the market." Mansfield argues that the federal govern-
ment’s technological investments should be made in conjunction with
potential users. Given the unexpected nature of many of the radical
discoveries and the critical role of previously unknown entrants, this
approach seems problematic--perhaps even counterproductive.
Consider what would have been the fate of the Department of
Defense’s funding of the development of the Internet during the 1960s, or
the National Institutes of Health’s funding of genetic engineering re-
search during the early 1970s, had federal program officers been required
to obtain agreement that these technologies were commercially relevant
from executives in the research departments of the major computer and
pharmaceutical companies (or, even more improbably, had they been
required to obtain matching funds from these organizations). This
research would have never been undertaken had it not been motivated by
the agencies’ missions of providing a strong national defense and better
health. To add such a market test would likely harm federal officials’
ability to fund very long-run research.
ADDRESSING THREATS TO NEW ENTRANTS
Second, if new entrants are playing a vital role in introducing radical
innovations, addressing several threats to their future development
should be a priority. The area that I believe deserves particular attention
relates to intellectual property protection, particularly patents. The U.S.
patent system has undergone a profound shift over the past 15 years. The
strength of patent protection has been dramatically bolstered, and both
large and small firms are devoting considerably more effort to seeking
patent protection and defending their patents in the courts. Many in the
patent community--officials of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the
patent bar, and corporate patent staff--have welcomed these changes.
But viewed more broadly, the reforms of the patent system and the
consequent growth of patent litigation have created a substantial "inno-
vation tax" that afflicts some of America’s most important and creative
small firms.2
Almost all formal disputes involving issued patents are tried within
the federal judicial system. The initial litigation must be undertaken in a
district court. Prior to 1982, appeals of patent cases were heard in the
2 One question raised by this argument is, if these obstacles are important, why has the
share of R&D expenditures being undertaken by small firms substantially increased in
recent years? The rapid pace of change in many facets of information and communications
technology may have created more opportunities for newer organizations. Many observers
have noted the difficulties that established organizations have had in responding to rapid
technological change: for one example, see Jensen’s (1993) discussion of the "major
inefficiencies [that exist] in the R&D spending decisions of a substantial number of firms."DISCUSSION 211
appellate courts of the various circuits, which differed considerably in
their interpretation of patent law. Because few appeals of patent cases
were heard by the Supreme Court, substantial differences persisted,
leading to widespread "forum shopping" by litigants.
In 1982, the U.S. Congress established a centralized appellate court
for patent cases, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). As
Robert Merges (1992) observes:
While the CAFC was ostensibly formed strictly to unify patent doctrine, it was
no doubt hoped by some (and expected by others) that the new court would
make subtle alterations in the doctrinal fabric, with an eye to enhancing the
patent system. To judge by results, that is exactly what happened.
The CAFC’s rulings have been more "pro-patent" than those of the
previous courts. For instance, the circuit courts had affirmed 62 percent of
district court findings of patent infringement in the three decades prior to
the creation of the CAFC, while the CAFC in its first eight years affirmed
90 percent of such decisions (Koenig 1980; Harmon 1991).
The strengthening of patent law has not gone unnoticed by corpo-
rations. Over the past decade, the number of patents awarded to U.S.
corporations has increased by 50 percent. Furthermore, the willingness of
firms to litigate patents has increased considerably. The number of patent
suits instituted in the federal courts increased from 795 in 1981 to 1553 in
1993; adversarial proceedings within the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office increased from 246 in 1980 to 684 in 1992 (Administrative Office,
various years; U.S. Department of Commerce, various years). My recent
analysis of litigation by firms based in Middlesex County, Massachusetts,
suggests that six suits related to intellectual property are filed for every
100 patent awards to corporations.
These suits lead to significant expenditures by firms. Based on
historical costs, I estimate that patent litigation begun in 1991 will lead to
total legal expenditures (in 1991 dollars) of over $1 billion, a substantial
amount relative to the $3.7 billion spent by U.So firms on basic research in
1991. (These findings are summarized in Lerner 1995.) Litigation also
leads to substantial indirect costs. The discovery process is likely to
require the alleged infringer to produce extensive documentation, in-
volve time-consuming depositions from employees, and generate unfa-
vorable publicity. The firm’s officers and directors may also be held
individually liable.
As firms have realized the value of their patent positions, they have
begun reviewing their stockpiles of issued patents. Several companies,
including Texas Instruments, Intel, Wang Laboratories, and Digital
Equipment, have established groups that approach rivals to demand
royalties on old patent awards. In many cases, they have been successful
in extracting license agreements or past royalties. For instance, Texas212 Joshua Lerner
Instruments is estimated to have netted $257 million in 1991 from patent
licenses and settlements resulting from their general counsel’s aggressive
enforcement policy (Rosen 1992).
Particularly striking, practitioner accounts suggest, has been the
growth of litigation--and threats of litigation--between large and small
firms.3 This trend is disturbing. While litigation is clearly a necessary
mechanism to defend property rights, the proliferation of such suits may
lead to transfers of financial resources from some of the youngest and
most innovative firms to more established, better capitalized concerns.
Even if the target firm believes that it does not infringe, it may choose to
settle rather than fight. It may be unable to raise the capital to finance a
protracted court battle, or it may believe that the publicity associated with
the litigation will depress the valuation of its equity.
In addition, these small firms may reduce or alter their investment in
R&D. For instance, a 1990 survey of 376 firms found that the time
and expense of intellectual property litigation was a major factor in the
decision whether to pursue an innovation for almost twice as many firms
with under 500 employees as for larger businesses (Koen 1990). These
claims are also supported by my study (1995) of the patenting behavior of
new biotechnology firms that have varying litigation costs. I showed that
firms with high litigation costs are less likely to patent in subclasses with
many other awards, particularly those of firms with low litigation costs.
These effects have been particularly pernicious in emerging indus-
tries. Chronically strained for resources, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office officials are unlikely to assign many patent examiners to emerging
technologies in advance of a wave of applications. As patent applications
begin flowing in, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office frequently finds
the retention of the few examiners skilled in the new technologies
difficult. Companies are likely to hire away all but the least able
examiners. These examiners are valuable not only for their knowledge of
the examination procedure in the new technology, but also for their
understanding of what other patent applications are in process but not
yet awarded. (U.S. patent applications are held confidential until time of
award.) Many of the examinations in emerging technologies are, as a
result, performed under severe time pressures by inexperienced examin-
ers. Consequently, awards of patents in several critical new technologies
have been delayed and highly inconsistent. These ambiguities have
created ample opportunities for firms that seek to aggressively litigate
their patent awards. The clearest examples of this problem are to be
found in the biotechnology and software industries.
3 Several examples are discussed in Chu (1992). Examples include the dispute between
Cetus Corporation and New England Biolabs regarding the taq DNA polymerase and that
between Texas Instruments and LSI Logic regarding semiconductor technology.DISCUSSION 213
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I concur in large part with Mansfield’s thoughtful and
well-reasoned policy recommendations. My main concern is that we
avoid taking steps in the name of increasing competitiveness that actually
interfere with the workings of the American system of innovation. The
1982 reforms of the patent litigation process have had exactly this sort of
unintended consequence; and I fear that any efforts to make federal
research more commercially relevant will do likewise.
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